Speaker:Joseph Clanin

Additive Security Games

Security games model asset protection scenarios between attackers and defenders over a collection of targets. This work analyzes a class of not-necessarily-zero-sum security games in which a resource-constrained attacker and defender allocate their resources over a finite target set under an additive utility constraint. A characterization of the Nash equilibria in such games is given in terms of necessary structural properties and a quadratic time algorithm to compute an equilibrium is proposed. An application of the special case of a zero-sum additive game to optimal deployment of defensive resources against transmission line attacks in power grids is presented. The efficacy of this approach is verified through simulation on standard IEEE power system test cases.

Committee: Sourabh Bhattacharya (major professor), Manimaran Govindarasu, and Yan-bin Jia

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