

# Monitoring the Monitor: An Approach towards Trustworthiness in Service Oriented Architecture

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## ABSTRACT

The key notion in service-oriented architecture is decoupling clients and providers of a service based on an abstract service description, which is used by the service broker to point clients to a suitable service implementation. A client then sends service requests directly to the service implementation. A problem with the current architecture is that it does not provide trustworthy means for clients to specify, service brokers to verify, and service implementations to prove that certain desired non-functional properties are satisfied during service request processing. An example of such non-functional property is access and persistence restrictions on the data received as part of the service requests. In this work, we propose an extension of the service-oriented architecture that provides these facilities. We also discuss a prototype implementation of this architecture and report preliminary results that demonstrate the potential practical value of the proposed architecture in real-world software applications.

## Categories and Subject Descriptors

D.2.4 [Software Engineering]: Software/Program Verification - Assertion checkers; D.2.11 [Software Engineering]: Software Architectures - Domain Specific Architectures

## General Terms

Measurement, Security, Verification

## Keywords

Service Oriented Architecture, trust, client-side data privacy.

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Service-oriented architectures (or service-oriented computing paradigm) promote abstraction, loose coupling and interoperability of clients and services [5, 10, 11]. The key idea is introduce a published interface (often in the form of a description written in web services definition language (WSDL [4]), which acts as a basis for communication between three type of entities : service implementation (or providers), service mediation (or brokers), and service

consumption (or clients). The communication follows the sequence publish-find-bind-execute to discover and use services [5, 10, 11]. The published interface describes the functional requirements for co-ordination between service implementations and clients. Every service implementation must satisfy its functional requirements. For example, a published interface for a location-based hotel finding service may expect clients to provide a GPS co-ordinate in a specified format and expect the service implementation to produce the address of the nearest hotel as a string to that GPS co-ordinate. The specification of input (GPS co-ordinate) and output (the hotel's address) describe the functional requirements for this service.

Until recently specifying and verifying functional and non-functional requirements have not received much attention. Most recently some approaches are proposed to verify construction of web-services such as that by Kuo *et al.* [7], which helps verify whether a given message exchange is legal. On the other end of the spectrum are approaches to validate the functional and non-functional requirements of a running service-oriented architecture such as by Baresi *et al.* [3], Barbon *et al.* [2], Mahbub and Spanoudakis [8], which aim to ensure — using dynamic monitoring — that a service-oriented architecture is satisfying its requirements. The domain of this work is the later set of approaches.

In service-oriented architectures, services are often executed on machines that not owned or operated by users. To monitor a service for functional requirements, such as “R1: the response given by the location-based hotel finding service shall be the closest hotel to the GPS co-ordinate specified by the client”, it is sufficient to observe or test the interface of the service. On the other hand, to validate requirements such as “R2: the service shall not persist the GPS co-ordinate supplied by the client”, it may not be sufficient to validate just the external interface. This validation may only come from a monitor that is executing in the same domain as the service implementation and that can validate, by observing the running service implementation, that the requirements such as R2 are indeed satisfied. The design and development of such monitors is a widely studied problem (e.g. see [6]). Nevertheless the key question remains, in a (possibly) untrusted domain who guarantee's the integrity of the monitor? In other words, who monitors the monitor?

The goal of our approach is as follows: given a set of service specification ( $S$ ), a service implementation ( $I$ ), a monitor that is capable of detecting deviations in the execution of the service implementation from its specification ( $M : SXI \rightarrow \{true, false\}$ ) running in a trusted environment, and a monitor that is similarly capable, but may be running in an untrusted environment ( $M' : SXI \rightarrow \{true, false\}$ ), how can we detect whether  $M \equiv M'$ ?

What we do not do: we are not proposing an approach for runtime requirements monitoring, there are many other research papers

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on this topic e.g. [6]. We do not propose to monitor functional requirements using our approach, they can very well be monitored by observing (or testing) the externally visible interface of the service.

To give the reader an idea of the problem with verifying a monitor in an untrusted environment without a root of trust, let us for a moment assume that such a validation mechanism  $V' : MXM' \rightarrow \{true, false\}$  exists. Now in order to answer this validation question, there must be a part of  $V'$  running in the same untrusted environment that can observe  $M'$  to compare it with  $M$ . If not,  $V'$  will depend on the untrusted environment to observe  $M'$ , which in turn may mask the true responses of  $M'$  with expected responses for  $M$  thereby invalidating the premise that  $V'$  exists. On the other hand, if some part of  $V'$ , say  $\delta V'$  is running in the same untrusted environment to observe  $M'$ , we will need another monitor to verify that the integrity of  $\delta V'$  is not compromised, which will need to be verified again, *ad infinitum*. In summary,  $V'$  may not exist.

We propose to use a hardware-based mechanism as a root of trust for such validation mechanism. Let us consider the example described in the previous paragraph. In this example, if we could be sure that there exist a  $\delta V'$  such that we do not need another monitor to verify its integrity,  $\delta V'$  would make  $V'$  realizable. Fortunately, recent research results have shown that realization of such hardware-based root of trust is possible in the form of a *Trusted Platform Module* (TPM) [15, 14]. TPMs is a co-processor that is now being shipped with every CPU of major processor vendors such as Intel and AMD and is therefore available broadly. In this work, we describe an architecture based on TPM to validate the integrity of a runtime requirement monitor, which will in turn facilitate trusted services.

Section 2 describes trusted platform modules, which form the basis of our proposed architecture. Section 3 describes our proposed architecture. The experimental evaluation of a prototype implementation conforming to this architecture is discussed in Section 4. Section 5 compares and contrasts our work with the related approaches. Section 6 discusses future work and concludes.

## 2. TRUSTED PLATFORM MODULE

A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a trusted agent co-processor within a remote computing platform which derives its root of trust from its manufacturer or a delegated trusted third party [17]. A TPM can be trusted to perform certain actions truthfully despite being an integral part of a potentially malicious or compromised system. In other words, it is our trusted ambassador in a friendly or hostile foreign territory. A TPM provides roots of trust for storage, measurement, and reporting of measurement.

Every TPM has a unique number assigned to it by the manufacturer called the *Endorsement Key*. This key can be used by the owner to anonymously confirm that the identity keys were generated by the TPM in his system. In essence, every computer has a unique identity which cannot be repudiated. This can serve to be a fool-proof identity for every user. There is also a facility for on-chip public and private key pair generation using the inbuilt hardware Random Number Generator. This make it possible for the TPM to do encryption and decryption of data.

The TPM also has a set of registers called *Platform Configuration Registers* which can be used to store the 160-bit hash values obtained using the SHA1 hashing algorithm of the TPM. The hardware ensures that the hash value of any PCR can be changed only by encrypting the new data over previous hash value of the PCR. In this way, PCRs can be used to indelibly record the history of the machine since the last reboot. The PCRs are cleared off at the time of every reboot.

Over the past few years, computer industry has come up with

many initiatives to guarantee security, integrity and confidentiality of data through innovative hardware-based Architectures. A consortium of key industry players, Trusted Computing group (TCG) [17], came up with the specifications for a TPM with such a goal. The TCG vision was that this rudimentary TPM supported trust can be bootstrapped into a higher level trust through some software trust architecture or design principle. Another popular initiative is the Next-Generation Secure Trusted Computing Base (NGSCB) [9]. The hardware vendors are moving towards installing TPM on every computer that ships.

## 3. APPROACH




Figure 1: Our Proposed Architecture

Our proposed architecture is shown in Figure 1. The key additions to the standard SOA is a new interface that we call *trust negotiation and verification interface*. The purpose of this interface is to provide an abstraction for the clients to negotiate desired integrity levels and for brokers to verify that the service implementation is indeed conforming to the desired service specification. The trust negotiation and verification interface between the service broker and the service provider also allows broker to communicate with its trusted agent, the trusted platform module, and with service specific trust monitor in the service providers domain. The role of the trusted platform module is to periodically validate the integrity of the trust analyzer that in turn validates the conformance of the service implementation with the service specification.

We have implemented a very simple system based on this hypothesized architecture to show the feasibility of our approach. Our system is shown in Figure 2. To recapitulate briefly, in a SOA there are three main entities: the service provider, the service broker and the client (customer). In the context of this paper, the words client, customer and end user are used interchangeably. The client contacts the service broker with a request and the broker directs the requester to the service provider. In our example system, the service broker also acts as the trusted third party. The monitor in this case is very simple, it verifies whether the service implementation on the service provider's side is genuine. This monitor can be directly implemented using the trusted platform module's primitives.

The trusted third party hosts an authentication server to authenticate whether the service implementation on the service provider's side is genuine. It does so by verifying whether the implementation

has changed since the last known deployment. For the purpose of this simple system, we are assuming that if the service provider had malicious intentions, the service implementation would be modified to either store or process the confidential customer data. It may not always be necessary; however, but we are deferring dynamic monitoring for future work. The goal of this architecture is to help the client to successfully complete the transaction with an assurance from the trusted third party that the service provider has not stored or processed the confidential data that were provided by the customer.

The algorithm for verifying the integrity is as described below.

1. A clean-room copy of the service implementation is provided by the service provider to the trusted third party.
2. The authentication server on the trusted third party takes integrity measurements by computing the 160-bit hash of important configuration files, source files and class files of the web-service implementation in a specific order using the in-built Sha1 hash engine of the TPM and stores it for future reference.
3. The authentication server sends an ordered list of files to the TPM on service provider's side. The TPM computes the 160-bit hash of these files in the given order and sends it across to the authentication server.
4. When the authentication server receives the hash from the TPM, it is compared with the reference value stored at the time of clean-room measurement of the software.
5. Even if there is a slight difference in any of the measured files, there will be significant variations in the calculated SHA1 hash value from that file onwards. Wang *et al.* [20] claims that it takes  $2^{69}$  units of time to find SHA1 collisions implying that collisions are very rare.
6. If the hash value received is different from the reference hash value, the service broker which is also the trusted third party can notify the customer of a possible violation.

The measurements made by the trust analyzer on the service provider's side are stored in a specific PCR of the TPM. The contents of this PCR is encrypted using the public part of the *Attestation Identity Key (AIK)* of the trusted third party's TPM before sending data to it. AIK is a special purpose asymmetric signature key created by the TPM manufacturer, the private portion of which is non-migratable and protected by the TPM. Thus, whatever data is received from the trust analyzer is trustworthy. The TPM of the trusted third party decrypts the PCR data using the private part of the AIK. This ensures that the hash value sent to the authentication server cannot be tampered by the service provider.

When the SOAP server restarts or a patch is applied to the software, the above steps are repeated when one of the following happens on the service provider's side because it might result in a change of the hash value stored in the PCR, even if there are no violations. For small files the inbuilt hash engine in the TPM can be used to compute the hash value. Whereas, for large pieces of data, it is advantageous to use a hash engine outside the TPM, as the TPM hardware may be too slow in performance for such purposes. This is the main reason for measuring only parts of the software that deal with the handling of confidential data and the files that deal with the critical system configuration.




Figure 2: An Implementation of the Proposed Architecture




Figure 3: Example of Trust Violation by a Web Service

## 4. EVALUATION

This section describes an evaluation of our implementation for a simple web service dealing with financial transactions. This web service is described in the following subsection.

### 4.1 Example Web Service

Figure 3 depicts a common case of violation of trust by web services involved in financial transactions. The web service takes the credit card number, the card validation code (cvc) and the purchase order as input from the customer. At the end of the transaction, the customer gets back the invoice number, which is the output of the web service. In this example, the customer is unaware of the fact that the web service provider has processed the customer's input for adversarial purposes and that it has stored his credit card number in a local database. The web service may have been certified as compliant at the time of deployment, but later, it might have been reprogrammed by the service provider with a malicious intent. This violation of trust goes undetected. In essence, without much ado, the web service provider has extracted the customer's credit card number and other sensitive data. Currently, there are no established strategies for detecting such violations of trust.

### 4.2 Experimental Setup

The architecture was implemented using two Dell Precision 390

stations each having Intel Core2 Duo Processor @ 1.86 GHz and 2 GB of RAM. Both the stations have a TPM (Version 1.2) manufactured by Atmel Corporation, embedded in them. The Atmel TPMs in these stations have 24 PCRs each. One of the stations is assigned the role of a service provider while the other plays the role of a trusted third party. We used the *tpm4java* [18] for developing our trust analyzer to measure the implementation on the service provider. The Java library *tpm4java*, developed at TU-Darmstadt, Germany, is used for accessing the TPM functionality from Java applications. The test environment consists of Apache Web server Version 2.2, Tomcat Servlet Container Version 5.5.23 and Axis SOAP server Version 2-1.1.1 running on Windows XP Professional operating system.

### 4.3 Experiment

For evaluating this architecture, we created the web-service that carries out an online transaction for a customer as described in Section 4.1. This web service is invoked from a web browser. The customer gives the credit card number and the card validation code along with the list of items to be purchased. On the implementation side, we have two files *Order.java* and *Process.java* that contain the code for carrying out this transaction and for giving back an invoice number as the output. There are two versions of these files. The first version is exactly according to the web service specification. Whereas, the second version is very similar to the first one except that it has been altered to store the credit card numbers locally.

**Table 1: TPM Measurements for a Genuine and a Malicious Service (Details Elided)**

File	160-bit SHA1 Hash of Genuine Program	160-bit SHA1 of the Modified Program
../EchoHeaders.jws	34F6....32B7	34F6....32B7
../Order.java	<b>F354....1A43</b>	<b>3D12....FCCB</b>
../httpd.conf	C9FD....4AA7	4FFF....B99F
../mime.types	7996....4748	17A4....8059

The first column of the Table 1 lists the names of the files in the web-service implementation. The second column in the Table 1 shows the 160-bit hash values of PCR #10 during clean-room measurements of the software. The third column shows those measurements that were obtained after the source-code had been altered. It can easily be observed that the hash values in the third column starting from the entry corresponding to the file *Order.java* are all different from their corresponding entries in the second column. This is because the SHA1 hashing algorithm in the TPM not only hashes the contents of the candidate files but also preserves the order in which the files were hashed. This implies that at least one file including *Order.java* has been altered without the knowledge of the trusted third party. The list of files that were monitored, which includes log files, class files and executables, is long and only a subset of this list is published in this paper to demonstrate the viability of the concept. Thus, our architecture can detect a violation of trust in a web service implementation and can produce evidence for the same. A web service deployed in such a setting can claim to be "trust preserving".

## 5. RELATED WORK

Ever since the 1970s, efforts have been made to produce secure operating systems [16] as a basis for secure computing. Any system can be thought of as consisting of many layers of abstractions.

The integrity of a system is built recursively through a chain of integrity checks starting from the lowermost level of abstraction. Each level is checked for integrity before passing the control to the next higher level. In 1997, Arabaugh et al. proposed an architecture for secure and reliable bootstrapping called AEGIS [1]. In AEGIS, the integrity checks begin from the power-on and continue till the control is handed over to the operating system. AEGIS modifies the boot process so that all executable code is verified using digital signatures prior to its execution. Here, the chain of trust begins from the software loaded in BIOS and PROM boards. AEGIS also incorporates the capability to recover from integrity failures using replacement modules. Thus, it can guarantee that the system initializes to a secure state. Microsoft has incorporated a feature called secure startup in the Longhorn version of Windows [9]. Secure startup has the capability to ensure that the PC running Longhorn starts in a known good-state. AEGIS cannot distinguish fake hardware from the genuine one. If the booting process is not sequential, certain non-trivial changes have to be made to the architecture.

In 2003, Grafinkel et al. proposed Terra, a virtual-machine based platform for Trusted Computing. Terra allowed multiple applications with diverse security requirements to run simultaneously on the same hardware. A virtual machine monitor was used to simultaneously partition the hardware into independent, isolated virtual machines. The software stack of each virtual machine could be tailored to meet the security requirements of the software running on that virtual machine. Terra can give digital certificates for all of the software running on the virtual machines, to the third party for verification. However, it is not possible to selectively measure individual software. The ever increasing number of device drivers pose a formidable challenge to implement the virtual machine monitor. Terra does not address the issue of loading untrusted drivers. Unlike AEGIS, Terra does not start from a secure boot process.

There are many ways and means to enforce policies such as confidentiality and security on the end-to-end behavior of a computing system. Such methods are broadly classified as *Information Flow Mechanisms*. Other than carrying out a rigorous analysis on the system as a whole to prove that it enforces the specified security policies, Information Flow Mechanisms also take into consideration the possibility of supplying malicious inputs to the program so that it terminates abnormally. Then, it is verified if confidential information can be extracted from the exception trace. Sablefeld et al. address such issues through language-based techniques for specification and enforcement of security policies in [13]. The limitation of this approach is that the security policies can only be specified by the programmer. The user of the software has no say in it. Identifying such short-comings, Vachharajani et al. proposed RIFLE [19], a user-centric run-time information flow architecture. Information flow systems such as this allow untrusted applications to access confidential data but prevents the data from getting leaked to other programs or covert channels. The authors claim that RIFLE can be used to enforce user-defined security policies on any program through a security-enhanced operating system. Such an architecture is useful if the user wants to be certain that the program running on his/her machine is not propagating any confidential local data, that the user is unaware of. It is difficult to apply this technique without major changes in the context of a Service Oriented Architecture because the web service implementation program runs elsewhere rather than locally.

In 2004, Sailer et al. proposed a TCG based Integrity Measurement Architecture for Linux [15]. This architecture made use of a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) hardware to store the integrity measurements of the system using the SHA1 Hash function module of the TPM hardware. Unlike AEGIS, this system only takes mea-

measurements and does not have a recovery process. Also, this system can take selective measurements of the software to create a representative evidence that can be interpreted by the remote party. The purpose of this architecture is to present an ordered list of measurements to a remote party. The remote system determines the integrity of the attested system by reconstructing the image of the attested system's software stack on the local system using these measurements and then by applying the security policy on the local software stack. To establish mutual trust, this process has to be carried out on both sides involved in the transaction [14]. This was implemented by instrumenting the Linux kernel to create measurements and to store them in the TPM hardware to protect against compromised systems. This architecture takes measurements of the kernel modules, executables and shared libraries, configuration files and other important files before they are loaded on the system. The advantage of this architecture is that it could verify integrity of a system up to its application layer (web server).

However, the process of mutual attestation is quite complex involving recreating the image of the other party on the local system based on the measurements obtained and then applying a security policy to it. The task of taking measurements is implemented by making modifications to the Linux kernel code. In case of online transactions, common users may not have the Linux operating system. In a majority of the cases, the two communicating parties may not have the same operating system in their environments. This makes it difficult to recreate the image locally based on the measurements sent out by the other party. Our architecture is designed to address these issues.

Another related approach is Aglet [12]. An aglet is a java object with a code component and a data component. The key idea here is to use these mobile agents to preserve privacy. An aglet consists of two distinct parts: the aglet core and the aglet proxy. The aglet core contains all the internal variables and methods. It provides interfaces through which the environment can make use of the aglet or vice versa. The core is encapsulated with an aglet proxy which acts as a shield against any attempt to directly access the private variables and methods of the aglet. This aglet proxy can be programmed to enforce local privacy requirements on the site of the remote entity. Aglets are deployed into aglet servers, which enforces the requirement of the security model. A key problem with aglets is that the integrity of aglets depends on the integrity of aglet servers, which cannot be guaranteed in an untrusted environment. However, our architecture can be used to ensure the integrity of the aglet server, which would then provide a basis of integrity for aglets.

## 6. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

A service-oriented architecture is only as secure as its weakest link. In a truly decoupled environment, which is the main motto of SOAs, including constructs to negotiate, enforce, and verify trust and security guarantees within the provider's application domain through the service discovery interfaces thus seems to be a crucial pre-condition of mission-critical deployment of SOAs. Our proposed architecture for ensuring the integrity of requirement monitors is a step in this direction. Our current experimental results have looked at static checksum as a method of ensuring the integrity of the monitor. In future, besides conducting an extensive evaluation of the overheads associated with this mechanism, we will also look into dynamic mechanisms.

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